Transhumanism is an intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through technologies — biotechnologies, neurotechnologies, artificial intelligence — to surpass illness, ageing, death and cognitive limits. It is not an established science but a debated philosophical position; the word appears with the biologist Julian Huxley in 1957.
This article gives the definition of transhumanism, distinguishes its currents and figures, then sets out the main ethical critiques — presenting the whole as an open debate, not as a settled truth. Nick Bostrom, one of its major theoretical voices, defines it as "an intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition" through applied reason and the wide availability of enhancement technologies.
The term "transhumanism" is often attributed to the biologist Julian Huxley, who used it in 1957 in his essay "Transhumanism" to designate the idea that humanity can transcend itself "by realising the possibilities of its nature": "man remaining man, but transcending himself." The contemporary movement took shape mainly from the 1980s-1990s, around authors and activist networks. In 1998, an international collective of authors — including the philosophers Nick Bostrom and David Pearce — drafted a "Transhumanist Declaration," adopted in 2009 by the board of the Humanity+ association; this reference text formulates the movement's claimed ambitions and safeguards.
A distinction in vocabulary helps to see clearly. Transhumanism describes a process of gradual improvement of the human; the "posthuman" designates the hypothetical state of a being whose capacities would so radically surpass ours that it would no longer be, strictly speaking, human. Philosophical posthumanism is yet another thing: a critical current that questions the centrality of the human, without necessarily advocating its technical augmentation. Confusing these terms blurs the debate.
Transhumanism is not a homogeneous bloc. It brings together diverse sensibilities, sometimes in tension, which crystallise around a few recurring themes. The NBIC report published in 2002 under the aegis of the U.S. National Science Foundation — "Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance," edited by Mihail Roco and William Bainbridge — illustrates how the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science shaped the imaginary of "improving human performance."
This diversity matters: criticising "the" transhumanism without specifying which wing one is talking about often amounts to aiming at a caricature. The proponents themselves argue fiercely about the caution to be observed.
A few names recur systematically. They must be read as authors defending discussed theses, not as authorities proving anything.
Nick Bostrom, a philosopher at Oxford, is one of the major theoretical voices of the current. He formulated structured arguments for it — notably in "Transhumanist Values" (2005) — while working extensively on "existential risks" and the danger of a superintelligence, proof that defending augmentation does not preclude fearing its excesses. His position is, in this sense, more nuanced than the label suggests.
Ray Kurzweil, an engineer and essayist, is associated with the thesis of the "Singularity": the idea of a tipping point where technological progress would become so fast that it would radically transform civilisation, with an announced fusion of human and machine. This thesis is a speculative prediction, based on extrapolations of trends, and it is strongly contested by many scientists.
Yuval Noah Harari, a historian, is often cited in these debates, but his position deserves a nuance: in his essays, he analyses and warns about the project of "improving" the human rather than promoting it. Ranking him among the promoters would be inaccurate; he acts more as a critical observer of a tendency he judges fraught with risks for equality and meaning.
Transhumanism raises serious objections, which have nothing irrational about them. The most structuring one opposes therapy — restoring a normal function, treating an illness — to enhancement — carrying a function beyond the normal in a healthy subject. Therapy is the object of broad consensus; enhancement, however, opens an unsettled debate, as analysed by the "Human Enhancement" entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The reference report of the U.S. President's Council on Bioethics, "Beyond Therapy" (2003), explores precisely this frontier and its ambiguities, without settling it in a word.
Around this dividing line several recurring objections unfold, which can be presented without imposing them:
One of the most cited critiques is that of the political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who called transhumanism "the world's most dangerous idea" in Foreign Policy in 2004: according to him, augmentation would threaten the human "essence" on which the equality of rights rests. This argument is itself contested — the notion of a fixed "human essence" is judged problematic by many biologists and philosophers — which shows that the critique of transhumanism is, too, a debate and not a verdict.
Conversely, proponents reply that refusing enhancement in the name of "nature" is arbitrary — medicine has always corrected nature — and that ethical oversight is better than a prohibition that would push these practices into the shadows. The debate remains open, and that is precisely what makes it serious: neither enthusiasm nor rejection has definitive proof.
"Is transhumanism dangerous?" is a bad question as long as you don't separate what is documented from what is speculated. Here is the honest ranking, documents in hand.
The fastest-moving transhumanism is not the one on futurist stages: it is the one in military budgets. DARPA's N3 program aims at surgery-free brain-computer interfaces for able-bodied soldiers. On the civilian side, Neuralink does have a first human patient (Noland Arbaugh, 2024) — but that is a medical use, in a person with tetraplegia. And the counter-example is instructive: TALOS, the combat exoskeleton promised as SOCOM's "Iron Man," was abandoned in 2019.
What this does not prove: an operational "army of augmented soldiers." The programs are real and funded; the spectacular capabilities remain largely prototypes or acknowledged failures. The line to watch is not the fantasy — it is the budget.
DOCUMENTED FACT: the existence of the movement, its founding texts (Huxley 1957, Declaration 1998/2009), the 2002 NBIC report and the real research programmes on brain-machine interfaces or ageing. HYPOTHESIS: the Singularity, the abolition of death, the "posthuman" — none of these promises is demonstrated, and the extrapolations carrying them are contested within the scientific community itself. Confusing the two registers, in either direction, is the most frequent error of this debate.
To follow this thread — from the laboratory to ethics — applied to the most tense case, that of the augmented combatant, our full investigation "The Soldier of Tomorrow" takes up each piece of the file by distinguishing the demonstrated from the speculated. And to situate these questions in their most exposed setting, see our reference dossier on military transhumanism, DARPA and Neuralink.
What is a simple definition of transhumanism? It is an intellectual and cultural movement that advocates improving the human condition through technologies (biotechnologies, neurotechnologies, artificial intelligence), to the point of surpassing limits deemed natural: illness, ageing, cognitive capacities, even death. The term is used by the biologist Julian Huxley as early as 1957.
Is transhumanism a science? No. It is a philosophical and cultural current of thought, which draws on real technologies but formulates projects and promises (life extension, the posthuman) that are, to date, neither demonstrated nor accomplished. One must distinguish existing research from the ideology that interprets it.
What is the difference between therapy and enhancement? Therapy restores a normal function (treating an illness, repairing a disability) and is consensual. Enhancement carries a function beyond the normal in an already healthy subject, and that is where the ethical debate opens, analysed notably by the "Human Enhancement" entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the "Beyond Therapy" report (2003).
What is the difference between transhumanism and posthumanism? Transhumanism advocates the gradual technical augmentation of the human; the "posthuman" designates the hypothetical state of a being with capacities radically superior to ours; philosophical posthumanism is, for its part, a critical current that questions the centrality of the human without advocating its augmentation.
What are the real dangers of transhumanism? The documented dangers are military dual use (DARPA's N3 program), the precedent of genetically edited babies (He Jiankui, sentenced in 2019) and possible attacks on mental integrity — to the point that Chile wrote neuro-rights into its Constitution (2021). Unequal access is a debated risk; consumer "human-machine merger" remains speculative.
Does military transhumanism already exist? The programs exist (DARPA's N3 for able-bodied soldiers); the spectacular capabilities do not. The first Neuralink implant (2024) is a medical use in a person with tetraplegia, and the TALOS combat exoskeleton was abandoned in 2019. Real programs, undemonstrated fantasies.
It is an intellectual and cultural movement that advocates improving the human condition through technologies (biotechnologies, neurotechnologies, artificial intelligence), to the point of surpassing limits deemed natural: illness, ageing, cognitive capacities, even death. The term is used by the biologist Julian Huxley as early as 1957.
No. It is a philosophical and cultural current of thought, which draws on real technologies but formulates projects and promises (life extension, the posthuman) that are, to date, neither demonstrated nor accomplished. One must distinguish existing research from the ideology that interprets it.
Therapy restores a normal function (treating an illness, repairing a disability) and is consensual. Enhancement carries a function beyond the normal in an already healthy subject, and that is where the ethical debate opens, analysed notably by the "Human Enhancement" entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the "Beyond Therapy" report (2003).
Transhumanism advocates the gradual technical augmentation of the human; the "posthuman" designates the hypothetical state of a being with capacities radically superior to ours; philosophical posthumanism is, for its part, a critical current that questions the centrality of the human without advocating its augmentation.
The documented dangers are military dual use (DARPA's N3 program), the precedent of genetically edited babies (He Jiankui, sentenced in 2019) and possible attacks on mental integrity — to the point that Chile wrote neuro-rights into its Constitution (2021). Unequal access is a debated risk; consumer "human-machine merger" remains speculative.
The programs exist (DARPA's N3 for able-bodied soldiers); the spectacular capabilities do not. The first Neuralink implant (2024) is a medical use in a person with tetraplegia, and the TALOS combat exoskeleton was abandoned in 2019. Real programs, undemonstrated fantasies.
Dossier : Transhumanisme militaire & DARPA
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