A CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) is a digital form of sovereign money, issued directly by a central bank. Today, nearly all central banks are exploring one, but very few have issued one, and several projects have failed or been pulled back. The ECB's digital euro is at the preparation stage, not a decided launch. The essential point to remember: a CBDC can be designed with or without surveillance and programmability; it is a governance choice, not a technical inevitability.
A central bank digital currency is public money in digital form, issued by the central bank itself. It differs from bank deposits, which are private money created by commercial banks, and from decentralised cryptocurrencies, which commit no state. It is a liability of the central bank towards the holder, just as a banknote is today.
The scale of the movement is documented by the institutions themselves. According to the annual survey of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), around 94% of the central banks surveyed were exploring a CBDC in 2023 (BIS Papers No 147), a proportion confirmed at around 91% in 2024 (BIS Papers No 159). The Atlantic Council's CBDC Tracker counts on the order of 130 to 140 countries, representing more than 98% of global GDP, at one stage or another (research, pilot, launch).
But exploring is not issuing. Only a small number of currencies have actually been launched (Bahamas, Jamaica, Nigeria), and their adoption remains marginal. The question is therefore no longer "is it happening?" but "in what form, with what safeguards, and how far?".
Two real pressures bear on central banks, and they explain the interest in CBDCs better than a narrative of pure surveillance does.
This nuance does not dissolve the risk: a public digital currency remains traceable by construction. But it corrects the idea of a single, coordinated will to surveil citizens.
The term that rightly causes concern is "programmability": the idea that money could carry rules of use (expiry dates, restrictions on purchase categories, spending conditions). Here, rigour demands a decisive distinction between technical capability and political choice.
In its note devoted to the implications of CBDCs (IMF FinTech Note 2023/008), the International Monetary Fund reports that several central banks explicitly state that they do not want to issue money that is "programmable" by the state, precisely out of fear of harming the fungibility of money: the principle whereby each unit is worth any other, with no condition attached.
This stated precaution is real. But it does not remove the technical capability: a centralised digital-money infrastructure can technically carry conditions, even if central banks today say they do not want to use it that way. In other words, the capability is documented; the declared intention is, to date, one of restraint. Vigilance therefore bears on legal safeguards (written into law, controllable) far more than on a purely technical fantasy. This is the central distinction of the whole subject: never confuse what a tool can do with what it has been decided it will do.
The digital euro is the European Central Bank's retail CBDC project. It is at the preparation and study stage: no decision to issue has been taken, and its launch would depend in particular on the adoption of a European legislative framework. It is presented as a complement to cash, not as its replacement, and the ECB states that it wants to preserve a high level of privacy for low-value payments.
Beware of the simplifications in circulation. The idea of a "3,000-euro limit decided for the digital euro" is a popular but inaccurate claim: the parameters (holding limits, privacy arrangements) are part of the ongoing debate and are not fixed as is sometimes asserted. Here again, these are political and regulatory choices, liable to evolve, not inevitable technical features.
If the digitisation of money were an inevitable grid, the CBDCs already issued would be triumphing. The documented facts mostly tell of difficulties and retreats.
The lesson is clear: the adoption of a CBDC depends less on technology than on trust. Where the public sees no clear benefit over existing means of payment, or fears control, it does not adopt. One large country has even, by political decision, closed this door. Nothing is settled in advance.
The monetary architecture advances through identifiable projects, several of which show that technical feasibility does not decide use.
This is the honest heart of the subject. A CBDC is neither surveilling nor protective by nature: everything depends on how it is designed and governed.
The case of the digital yuan (e-CNY) illustrates this. It is presented by its designers under the principle of "managed anonymity": small payments lightly traced, large payments identified. Neither total anonymity nor absolute traceability is accurate: the documented reality is a graduated traceability, configurable by the authority. It is precisely this parameter, which sets the threshold and can move it, that constitutes the stake of power.
Conversely, architectures such as intermediated privacy seek to limit what the central bank can see. The lesson is constant: the capability to surveil exists as soon as there is a centralised digital infrastructure; the actual degree of surveillance is, for its part, a governance choice that must be written into law to be binding.
The European Union has not legalised a grid of control: it has, on the contrary, set strong legal limits that would also apply to a CBDC.
To claim that "the EU is imposing social credit" is false: the same EU has banned it. These checks and balances (law, judges, regulators) are real, even if they remain asymmetric in the face of the speed of technological deployment.
Cash is declining, this is a measured fact (52% of point-of-sale payments in the euro area in 2024, down from 59% in 2022). But decline is not abolition. The ECB presents the digital euro as a complement to cash, and the right to cash remains an open public debate.
As long as cash exists, keeping and using it is not a nostalgic gesture: it is the preservation of an unconditional means of payment, one that requires no one's permission. The disappearance of cash, were it to occur, would be the result of political choices and habits, not of a technical necessity imposed by the CBDC.
Understanding makes it possible to demand the right safeguards. For a CBDC, a few concrete principles emerge from the sources.
The relevant question is not "do you trust the current power?" but "would you entrust this tool to the worst imaginable power, since one day it could inherit it?". That is why the limits must be carved into law, from the design stage.
Does a CBDC necessarily allow my purchases to be monitored? No, not necessarily. A centralised digital infrastructure has the technical capability, but the actual degree of traceability depends on the design and the legal rules. It is a political choice, not an inevitability.
Will the digital euro abolish banknotes? That is not the announced project. The ECB presents the digital euro as a complement to cash, of which no issuance has yet been decided. The abolition of cash would be a matter of political decisions, not of the CBDC itself.
Is the 3,000-euro limit for the digital euro confirmed? No. It is a popular but inaccurate claim: any limits are part of the ongoing regulatory debate and are not a fixed parameter.
Can a CBDC be programmable (money with an expiry date, purchase restrictions)? Technically, yes, the infrastructure would allow it. But several central banks state that they do not want to use it that way (IMF FinTech Note 2023/008), out of fear of harming fungibility. The real protection is the prohibition written into law.
Do all CBDCs succeed? No. The Sand Dollar (Bahamas) remains below 1% of the money in circulation, 98.5% of eNaira wallets (Nigeria) remained inactive (IMF WP/23/104), Sweden has not issued its e-krona, and the United States banned its CBDC in 2025. Adoption depends on trust, not on technology.
Is there a global conspiracy behind CBDCs? Nothing documents one. What is established is a convergence of distinct interests (monetary sovereignty, the fight against fraud, convenience) and a technical capability. A convergence of incentives is not a proven centralised coordination.
This synthesis draws on real, verifiable sources (BIS, ECB, IMF, Atlantic Council, EU texts). For the full investigation, document by document, into the convergence of digital money, identity and surveillance, and its limits, the ebook The Architecture of Control extends this overview by distinguishing, everywhere, capability from intention.
No, not necessarily. A centralised digital infrastructure has the technical capability, but the actual degree of traceability depends on the design and the legal rules. It is a political choice, not an inevitability.
That is not the announced project. The ECB presents the digital euro as a complement to cash, of which no issuance has yet been decided. The abolition of cash would be a matter of political decisions, not of the CBDC itself.
No. It is a popular but inaccurate claim: any limits are part of the ongoing regulatory debate and are not a fixed parameter.
Technically, yes, the infrastructure would allow it. But several central banks state that they do not want to use it that way (IMF FinTech Note 2023/008), out of fear of harming fungibility. The real protection is the prohibition written into law.
No. The Sand Dollar (Bahamas) remains below 1% of the money in circulation, 98.5% of eNaira wallets (Nigeria) remained inactive (IMF WP/23/104), Sweden has not issued its e-krona, and the United States banned its CBDC in 2025. Adoption depends on trust, not on technology.
Nothing documents one. What is established is a convergence of distinct interests (monetary sovereignty, the fight against fraud, convenience) and a technical capability. A convergence of incentives is not a proven centralised coordination.
Dossier : Monnaie & identité numérique : l'architecture du contrôle
TOME 2: L'Architecture du Contrôle
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